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SUMMARY 
This paper deals with the fundamental problem of socialist 
economies: how to ensure compatibility of financial equilibrium 
with efficient allocation of resources in a decentralized 
decision-making system. In order to ensure rational allocation 
of resources in a decentralized system, it is indispensable to 
apply marginal pricing of labour, materials and foreign curren- 
cies. In order to ensure financial equilibrium on the consumer 
market the financial system operates with average cost pricing 
rules, thus violating efficiency rules. Trying to solve this 
dilemma the constructors of economic reforms of the system give 
priority to financial equilibrium conditions by using average 
cost prices and exchange rates and correct them by subsidies 
differentiated for branches. This leads to bargaining processes 
and to the neglect of efficiency rules. The author proposes 
instead the use of a uniform subsidy of the central budget and 
presents variants of this systemic solution: in the form of a 
uniform subsidy to wage earners or in the form of a uniform 
suhsidy to enterprises. The formalized analysis is included in 
the appendix. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There is a general consensus among eastern economists, that 
in order to ensure higher efficiency it is necessary to decen- 
tralize the system of management--at least in some spheres of 
economic decision-making. Decentralization cannot simply mean 
"partitioning" of central decisions by delegating decision- 
making from higher levels to lower decision-making levels. De- 
centralized decisions at the level of enterprises must be taken 
up in a general systemic framework ensuring overall optimization 
of the economy. Decentralization must be based on the concept 
of decomposition. ' The indirect management system2 must take 
the form of a financial system internally consistent with the 
system of central strategic planning. Such a system must-- 
among others--fulfil the following conditions: 
- the profit maximization criterion becomes the basic 
success indicator at the enterprise level; 
~antorovich, L .V. 1960. Ekonomicheski j Raschet Nailuch- 
schevo Ispoll-ovaniya Resursov (Akademia Nauk SSR, Moskva) 
2 ~ .  Trzeciakowski. 1978. Indirect Management in a Cen- 
trally Planned Economy, North Holland. Amsterdam-New York-Oxford* 
- t he  p r o f i t  i s  measured i n  p r ices  f o r  producers, covering 
marginal cos t s  of t h e  l e a s t  e f f i c i e n t  producer (plus 
eventual s c a r c i t y  r e n t s )  
- t he  foreign t r ade  conversion r a t e s  (exchange r a t e s )  en- 
courage a l l  e f f i c i e n t  expor ters ,  hence these  r a t e s  a r e  
marginal r a t e s .  
However, i n  a l l  funct ioning s o c i a l i s t  management systems-- 
average--not marginal--prices and r a t e s  a r e  applied,  a s  w e l l  i n  
t h e  S.C. t r a d i t i o n a l  management systems, a s  a l so  i n  t h e  S.C. 
"economic reforms". 
In t he  t m d i t w n a l  system of  central obligatory d i rec t ives  it i s  
assumed t h a t  ine f f ic ien t - - in  terms of average prices--enter- 
p r i s e s  a r e  subsidized. Equally it is  assumed, t h a t  i n e f f i c i e n t  
--in terms of average exchange rates--exporters a r e  subsidized. 
This t r a d i t i o n a l  decision-making system could be defended--at 
l e a s t  i n  theory--as leading po t en t i a l l y  t o  e f f i c i e n t  so lu t ions ,  
assuming t h a t :  
- t he  c e n t r a l  obl igatory  d i r ec t i ve s  were optimal,  
- t he  subsidies  were f ixed  a t  t he  optimal l eve l .  
Needless t o  say, t h a t  none of t h e  above assumptions holds 
i n  p r ac t i ce  due t o  information cons t ra in t s  a t  t h e  c e n t r a l  l eve l .  
I n  p r ac t i ce  d i r e c t i v e s  a r e  t h e  r e s u l t  of bargaining f o r  lower 
plan t a r g e t s ,  production subsidies--of bargaining f o r  higher  
subsidies  f o r  producers, and export subsidies--of bargaining f o r  
higher subsidies  f o r  exporters .  
Within t he  framework of economic re foms  i n  t h e i r  a c tua l  forms 
(as  applied i n  Hungary and projected i n  Poland), t h e  systemic 
so lu t ions  a r e  equally quest ionable,  not  only on p r a c t i c a l ,  bu t  
a l s o  on t h e o r e t i c a l  grounds, as:  
- i f  de t a i l ed  central- d i r ec t i ve s  a r e  abolished, they cannot 
be t r e a t e d  anymore a s  instruments of ove ra l l  optimization 
( a s  i n  t h e  former, t r a d i t i o n a l  system); 
- if average cos t  p r ic ing  r u l e s  a r e  applied,  around hal f  of 
t he  producers becomes unprof i table ,  hence i s  e i t h e r  elim- 
ina ted  o r  subsidized;  i n  t h e  f i r s t  case t he  economy faces 
unemployment and unused productive capac i t i e s ,  i n  t h e  
second case the  cen t r a l  budget faces  bargaining procedures of 
thousands of en t e rp r i s e s ,  asking f o r  subsidies  covering a l l  
t h e i r  i ne f f i c i enc i e s :  
- i f  average fore ign t r ade  conversion coe f f i c i en t s  a r e  
applied,  about hal f  of t h e  exports  becomes unprof i table ;  
e i t h e r  t h i s  leads  t o  harmful import r e s t r i c t i o n s ,  damag- 
ing t h e  economy, o r  t o  export subsidies  with a l l  t h e  d i s -  
rup t ive  consequences (en te rpr i ses  ins tead  of improving 
foreign resources o r  decreasing domestic c o s t s  a r e  bar- 
gaining f o r  maximum budgetary subs id i e s ) .  
These weaknesses a r e  a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  fea tu re  a s  w e l l  of  
t he  Hungarian, a s  of t h e  Polish reform. The crux of t h e  prob- 
l e m  l ies  .in t h e  incompat ib i l i ty  of t he  t r a d i t i o n a l  f i nanc i a l  
system, aimed a t  ensuring equil ibrium of supply and demand on 
t h e  consumers' market, and t h e  systemic ru l e s  of r a t i o n a l  a l -  
loca t ion  of  resources.  
Is t he re  an explanation f o r  t he  conceptual and i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
weaknesses of these  reforms? Is t he re  a pos i t i ve  so lu t ion  t o  
t h e  problem? In  my opinion t he re  i s  a pos i t i ve  answer t o  both 
questions. 
2 .  THE HISTORICAL EXPLANATION OF THE USE OF 
AVERAGE COST PRICING 
What a r e  t h e  reasons why marginal p r ices  and r a t e s  have 
been neglected, whereas average pr ic ing r u l e s  have dominated and 
s t i l l  dominate? 
The function of a l l oca t i on  of resources has been always 
performed within t h e  system of planning i n  a l l  c e n t r a l l y  planned 
economies. This a l l oca t i on  function has been performed auto- 
nomously with no d i r e c t  connections with t h e  f i nanc i a l  system. 
This l a t t e r  system (including the  pr ic ing system) was looked 
upon so l e ly  a s  an instrument of f i nanc i a l  equilibrium. Prices 
w e r e  supposed not  t o  i n t e r f e r e  ac t ive ly  with t h e  a l l o c a t i v e  
decisions of planners.  This was achieved by using spec i a l  cor- 
r e c t i v e  l ev i e s  and subsidies  applied automatically by t he  c e n t r a l  
b.udget i n  order  t o  neu t r a l i ze  l o s se s  o r  p r o f i t s .  Hence, thb  
financial system played the role of an "obedient servant" of the 
planning system. Pricing policies had nothing to do with the 
allocation of resources, as price formation was dictated exclu- 
sively by considerations of financial equilibrium. Therefore 
the financial system was constructed in accordance with average 
cost-plus rules and interested solely with the distribution of 
financial means. However, in addition to the historical ex- 
planation, there exists another, more important reason for the 
exclusive reliance on average cost-plus pricing rules: the 
use of marginal pricing within the existing financial system 
would conflict with financial equilibrium and induce inflationary 
3.  RATIONAL ALLOCATION versus FINANCIAL EQUILIBRIUM 
IN EXISTING DECENTRALIZED DECISION-MAKING SYSTEMS 
In a decentralized socialist economy, determining centrally 
and autonomously the rate of investment there is no systemic 
guarantee that marginal pricing and financial equilibrium are 
mutually consistent. 
Wages are the main source of the purchasing power of the 
population and are the main component of domestic costs. The 
total wage bill, composed of wages in enterprises producing at 
low costs and in enterprises producing at high costs is close to 
the value of total production priced in average cost prices. 
Hence, the demand of the population, generated mainly by wages 
would cover supply, if production were priced in average cost 
prices, not marginal prices. On the other hand, the rules of 
rational allocation of resources in a decentralized system re- 
quire that production be priced in marginal cost prices. How- 
ever, in this latter case, the purchasing power of the popula- 
tion would be too small to cover supply. Producers'prices fixed 
at the marginal level contain accumulation margins that in total 
may be much bigger than the overall needs for investments and 
collective consumption. This is the real argument against the 
introduction of marginal pricing rules in socialist economies. 
Why is this problem so acute in socialist economies and 
why it does not appear in that form in capitalist market eco- 
nomies? Contrary to market economies, there exist in centrally 
planned economies a huge dispersion between average and marginal 
costs. This dispersion results from the lack of profit oriented 
investment criteria in socialist economies. The allocation of 
investment funds has been for decades determined by the central 
planner on the basis of various criteria not connected with 
profit maximization. This resulted in a very strong differentia- 
tion of efficiency indicators in various enterprises within sim- 
ilar branches, as well as in enterprises belonging to various 
branches. The most striking illustration of this phenomenon is 
the very high dispersion of foreign trade efficiency indicators 
for various export activities. This is evidently not the case 
in market economies. Hence, applying marginal cost pricing rules 
would result in socialist economies in huge accumulation margins, 
which, as a rule, would surpass by far the expenditures needed 
for investments and collective consumption. This type of a sur- 
plus does not appear in market economies, investments are fi- 
nanced from private enterprises' profits and collective consump- 
tion is covered by taxes. 
Another reason for disrupting equilibrium on the consumers' 
market is the lack of continuity in the trend of the share of 
accumulation in national income. Abrupt changes in the rate of 
investments occurring in consecutive planning periods, and 
equally changes in the level of collective consumption are 
frequent. Hence, the socialist reformers have opted,-and still 
opt, for average cost-plus pricing rules in order to keep finan- 
cial equilibrium on the consumers' market at the expense of 
efficiency: the use of differentiated "equalization subsidies" 
in production and exports leads to bargaining procedures. As a 
result the attention of managers in enterprises is focused on 
privileges (getting higher subsidies), instead of on objective 
achievements (lowering costs and improving prices). 
4. RATIONAL ALLOCATION d FINANCIAL EQUILIBRIUM IN 
DECENTRALIZED SYSTEMS 
A. Marginal Pricing and Subsidy to Wages: The change over from 
a system of centralized directive planning into a system of in- 
direct management based on marginal pricing requires the 
introduction of a new instrument of central regulation of over- 
all demand. A kind of "negative tax" for wages is what is 
needed. This new type of a subsidy is aimed at compensating 
this part of accumulation contained in marginal prices which 
exceeds the needs of a socialist society. This specific subsidy 
must be granted by the central budget. It cannot be born as an 
expenditure of enterprises, treated as an element of costs 
(otherwise a spiral of costs and prices would again destroy mar- 
ket equilibrium, inducing inflationary tendencies). In the 
course of time, when the discrepancy between marginal and aver- 
age costs diminishes, it is possible that the subsidy may become 
negative, taking the form of a normal (positive) tax. 
B. Average Cost Pricing and Subsidy to Enterprises: Experience 
proves that there exists a definite hostility towards marginal 
cost pricing and an attachment to average cost pricing. Besides, 
there is an intuitive fear, that marginal pricing would induce 
inflationary processes, which, once started, would then be 
difficult to stop. 
Assuming that these convictions of the planners are given, 
still it would be possible to eliminate the existing incompati- 
bility of efficiency considerations and equilibrium considera- 
tions by introducing a uniform subsidy to enterprises aimed at 
correcting the rates of substitution of resources from those 
based on average costs into those based on marginal costs. 
Let us illustrate it with the example taken from reality. 
The export curve of an existing economy has the following shape: 
Ex,,.. C, 
Let t h e  equi l ibr ium marginal r a t e s  of exchange be 100 t a l a r s  pe r  
d o l l a r  ( u n i t  of fore ign  currency) .  Let t h e  average c o s t  of earn- 
i n g  $1 be 50 ta1ars:-In accordance with t h e  r u l e s  of  r a t i o n a l  
a l l o c a t i o n  of resources  imported and expor table  m a t e r i a l s  should 
be pr iced  a t  100 t a l a r s  per  d o l l a r .  
However, t h e  a c t u a l  domestic p r i c i n g  of raw m a t e r i a l s  and 
imported m a t e r i a l s  i s  based on t h e  average exchange r a t e ,  hence, 
ma te r i a l s  a r e  p r i ced  domest ical ly  a t  50 t a l a r s  pe r  d o l l a r .  In  
o r d e r  t o  maintain t h e  necessary value of expor ts  t h e  c e n t r a l  
planner a p p l i e s  equa l i za t ion  subs id ies  d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  f o r  
branches. (Without t h e  subs id ies  t h e  unprof i t ab le  expor ts  would 
disappear ,  l ead ing  t o  a  decrease of  expor ts  from B t o  A,)  This 
s o l u t i o n  has t h e  fol lowing weaknesses: 
- it l eads  t o  bargaining f o r  p r iv i l eges :  t h e  c e n t r a l  
planner i s  n o t  capable t o  c o n t r o l  e f f e c t i v e l y  t h e  a c t u a l  
l e v e l  of  c o s t s ;  t h e  expor t ing  e n t e r p r i s e  can switch do- 
mest ic  overhead c o s t s  t o  expor t  production, thus  increas-  
ing  t h e  magnitude of t h e - e x p o r t  subsidy covering c o s t s ;  
- it focuses t h e  a t t e n t i o n  o f  t h e  manager of  t h e  e n t e r p r i s e  
on inc reas ing  t h e  subsidy (which i s  r e l a t i v e l y  easy)  in- 
s t e a d  of  concent ra t ing  h i s  e f f o r t s  on decreas ing  c o s t s  o r  
inc reas ing  p r i c e s  received abroad--thus causing in-  
e f f i c i e n c y ;  
- it des t roys  t h e  r a t i o n a l i t y  of economic ca lcu lus  by d i f -  
f e r e n t i a t i n g  t h e  domestic p r i c i n g  of i n p u t s  and outputs .  
- 
This d i s t o r t s  t h e  evalua t ion  of p r o f i t a b i l i t y  and may 
even l e a d  t o  promoting t h e  S.C.  "negat ive expor ts t ' ,  where 
t h e  fo re ign  earn ings  f o r  t h e  product do n o t  cover t h e  
fo re ign  currency value o f  inpu t s .  3  
3 ~ e t  t h e  normative use of  inpu t  be 1 kg of r o l l e d  i r o n  valued 
$0.80 and l e t  t h e  product be worth $1. Let  t h e  domestic producer 
use 2 kg of  r o l l e d  i r o n  f o r  t h e  same f i n a l  product. I n  terms of 
fore ign  currency ca lcu lus  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  l o s s  i s  $0.60 (no t  con- 
s i d e r i n g  processing c o s t s )  2 ~ 0 . 8 0  dol la rs+process ing  c o s t s  > $ 1  
I n  terms of domestic currency: inpu t s  a r e  pr iced  5 0 t a l a r s / d o l l a r ,  
hence 2 ~ 0 . 8 0 ~ 5 0  = 80 t a l a r s .  Outputs a r e  p r i ced  50 t a l a r s / d o l l a r  
+50 t a l a r s / subs idy  = 100 ta lars /$  Hence f o r  br inging  e f f e c t i v e .  
l o s s e s  ($0.60) t h e  producer g e t s  a  p r o f i t  (neglec t ing  processing 
c o s t s ) .  
Therefore, in order to correct the rates of substitution in 
accordance with marginal pricing (100:l) it is possible to grant 
a 50% wage subsidy to the enterprise. This will change the dis- 
torted ratio (50:l) into the correct ratio 50:1/2 = 100:l. In 
other words, an adequate share of the domestic cost (in the above 
example 50%) would be covered by the central budget, hence, the 
socialist enterprise would consider only the remaining costs in 
evaluating the profitability of a given activity. 
The essence of this alternative proposal is to substitute a 
uniform, parametrically determined subsidy, acting in full con- 
formity with the rules of economic calculus for non-parametric, 
differentiated equalization subsidies, incompatible with the 
requirements for efficiency. 
5. POSTULATES 
1. In order to ensure rational allocation of resources in a 
system of decentralized decision-making, it is indispensable 
to apply marginal pricing of labour, materials and foreign 
currencies. Prices operating within the financial system should 
express the marginal rates of substitution of these resources (by 
being equal to the relations of their marginal costs). 
2. The financial system must ensure financial equilibrium on the 
consumers1 market. 
3. From postulates 1 and 2 results the necessity to introduce 
a new instrument of the financial system in the form of a uni- 
form subsidy of the central budget. 
4. If prices and rates of exchange are determined at the level of 
marginal costs it is necessary to subsidize demand. The most 
suitable form seems to be a uniform subsidy to wage earners proportional 
to wages, or a subsidy to all consumer goods. 
5. If prices and rates of exchange are determined at the level of 
average costs it is possible to apply a uniform subsic& to enterprises 
in relation to labour costs. This subsidy reduces the level of 
enterprises1 costs and brings it to the adequate rate of sub- 
stitution, as determined by the marginal costs. 
6. In any case the subsidy must be paid by the central budget, 
thus avoiding the danger of inducing an inflationary spiral of 
increase of costs and prices. 
7. The subsidy must be fixed uniformly as a central parameter 
in order to avoid bargaining. This does not exclude the use of 
additional differentiation of subsidies to wages, necessitated 
by social incomes policy considerations. 
6. APPENDIX: MODEL ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM: EFFICIENCY AND 
FINANCIAL EQUILIBRIUM 
1. Shadow Prices and Retail Prices 
Let us denote: 
lk - shadow price of commodity k 
- marginal exchange rate (shadow price of currency of the 
foreign market r) 
V: - the retail price4 of commodity or service k on the domestic 
market of consumer goods 
K - planned volume of individual consumption of commodity k (the 
'k use of commodity k f r investment and collective consumption a is not included in Pk) 
R - labour cost in the enterprise i 
B - the difference between that part of the wage fund which does 
not correspond to the production and service activities 
(pensions, administrative wages, etc..) and that part of 
consumers' income which is not spent on individual consump- 
tion (savings, taxes, ect. ) 
The condition for overall equilibrium on the market of the 
consumer goods can be written as: 
1vdpK = IR + B 
k k k  i 
The retail prices V: must insure not only overall equilibrium (1) 
but also the equality of the supply of and demand for each com- 
modity or service on the market of consuner- goods. 
4 ~ o r  the sake of simplicity, retail and wholesale prices of 
consumer goods are assumed to be equal. 
Let us now denote by B the relative level of the shadow prices as 
compared with the retail prices (the ratio of the individual 
consumption bundle priced in shadow prices to the same bundle 
priced in retail prices) : 
using (1) B can be written in the form: 
@ depends on B and the parameters of the problem of current opti- 
mization of the national economy. It does not depend on the 
preferences of consumers. There is no reason for @ to be equal 
to unity in the planned economy.5 The rate of accumulation is 
a decision variable and @ depends on that rate. 
d Vk depends on the preferences of consumers. However, it does not 
mean.that the structure of the individual consumption is deter- 
mined according to the consumers' preferences. Assuming this 
K 
additionally, i.e., assuming that the planned values of Pk maxi- 
mize the consumers' utility function at given TR, investment and 
1 K 
collective consumption, one can derive (for B independent of Pk) 
the principle of mutual proportionality of the shadow prices and 
6 the equilibrium retail prices. In this principle, the coeffi- 
cient of the proportionality equals B :  
5 ~ n  the perfect free market economy in t e absence of any 2 taxes or subsidies, except for income tax - Vk = lk and, there- 
fore @ = 1. 
6~ycielski J. , 1965. Ceny Kalkulacyjne, ceny detoliczne, 
Kursy dewizowe. Gospodarka Planowa No. 12/1965, Warsaw 
2. The Principles of the Proposed Financial System 
If the financial system has to be the basis for the current 
optimization of the national economy according to the concept of 
profit maximization, one must postulate the equivalence of the 
accounting profit and the financial objective function to be 
maximized in each enterprise. Hence, the financial objective 
function should be equal to the accounting profit multiplied by 
a certain positive constant a, minus a certain constant J. 
Let pk denote the difference between the output and input 
of commodity k in the enterprise. In other words pk is the net 
output of commodity k in case pk > 0, and the net input in case 
Pk < 0. 
The basic financial objective function of the enterprise can 
be written: 
Let us now write (5) using prices V and exchange rates Nr k 
of the financial system (in the sphere of production), assuming 
the mutual proportionality of these financial system prices to 
shadow prices: 
Vk = bl for all commodities k 
Nr =   MI for all foreign markets 
The financial objective function (5) can now be written: 
If the enterprise is exporting to or importing from the foreign 
market r the one of the pk denotes the foreign receipts or ex- 
penditures, and the corresponding Vk should be understood as the 
r 
exchange rate N . 
Let zFB denote the gross financial profit of the enterprise, 
i.e., the difference between the value of outputs priced in Vk 
and the value of inputs priced similarly, and the direct labour 
cost: 
where Sk = inputs. 
Let us now introduce the following magnitudes: 
Now the basic financial objective function (8) can be 
FN . written in the form of the net financial profit Z . 
Economic decisions concerning current management sho.uld be 
made at particular enterprises according to the principle of 
FN maximization of Z . The central planning authority has to 
change the prices Vk and exchange rates Nr in such a way as to 
assume the fulfillmentof the balances of all commodities and of 
foreign trade with all.foreign markets. Of course, only a part 
of zFN should be left at the disposal of the enterprise; the 
remaining part of zFN should be transferred to the national 
budget in the form of an income tax. 
D The tax (or subsidy) S . is proportional. to .value added. 
The tax (or subsidy) sR is proportional to labour cost. 
Both taxes (or subsidies) are of a price-forming nature: they 
influence the equilibrium values of Vk and Nr. 
The tax (or subsidy) J does not depend on the decision variables 
of current management; it may depend e.g., on investment decision 
variables. 
In a centrally planned economy retail prices V: may differ 
from the prices V paid to the producers. The difference is a k 
tax operating in the sphere of individual consumption; for com- 
modity k this tax equals: 
The sum of taxes S: will be denoted by S K 
Using (2) , (6) and (1 3) one obtains 
If the principle (4) is accepted, one obtains from (6) the mutual 
proportionality of the system of retail prices and the system of 
prices in the sphere of production: 
Moreover, formula ( 1 3) then gives : 
i.e., the uniform rate of taxation for all consumer goods. 
Summing up: 
The financial equilibrium consists: 
- in the equilibrium in the sphere of individual consumption 
and is reached by maintaining the retail prices at a proper level 
(dependent on the required level of accumulation) and by using 
K taxes Sk. 
- in the equilibrium of particular enterprises in the sphere 
of production. 
3. Variantf of the Financial System 
In the proposed financial system with arbitrarily determined 
R 
values of the constants a and b, all three taxes sD, S and S K 
differ from zero. Moreover, it follows from (1 0) , (1 1 ) and (1 5) 
that it is not possible, in general, to determine the values of 
a and b so as to assure the disappearance of all these taxes; 
this would be possible only if B=1 (then a=b=l). 
It can be shown, however, that by an appropriate choice of 
values of a and b it is possible to make two of the three taxes 
D R K S , S and S vanish. This can be done in three ways. 
Variant 1. 
If a=b=1 then sD=sR=O and 
The system of prices Vk and exchange rate NI is identical 
to the system of shadow prices and marginal exchange rates, and 
the gross financial profit and the net financial profit (for 
J=0) are identical to accounting profit. If principle (4) is 
K accepted, the retail prices V: and taxes Sk are: 
for all consumer goods. 
Variant 2. 
If a=l and b A  then sD=sK=O and 53 
The prices Vk and exchange rates NI equal the shadow prices 
and marginal exchange rates, respectively, divided by B: the 
n e t  f i n a n c i a l  p r o f i t  ( f o r  J=0) equals  t h e  accounting p r o f i t .  I f  
p r i n c i p l e  ( 4 )  is  accepted ,  t h e  r e t a i l  p r i c e s  V; equal  t h e  p r i c e s  
Vk ( t h e r e  i s  only one p r i c e  system i n  t h e  n a t i o n a l  economy) and 
t h e  taxes  S; a l l  vanish. 
f o r  a l l  consumer goods. 
Variant 3. . 
1 I f  a=b=- , then sD=sK=O and B 
The p r i c e s  Vk, exchange r a t e s  NI and n e t  f i n a n c i a l  p r o f i t  
( f o r  J = O )  equal  t h e  shadow p r i c e s ,  marginal exchange rates and 
accounting p r o f i t ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y  divided by B. I f  p r i n c i p l e  ( 4 )  
i s  accepted, t h e  re ta i l  p r i c e s  V; equal  t h e  p r i c e s  Vk ( t h e r e  i s  
only one p r i c e  system i n  t h e  n a t i o n a l  economy) and t h e  t axes  S; 
a l l  vanish. 
f o r  a l l  consumer goods. 
When $ < 1 then  a s  follows from ( 1 8 ) ,  (21) and (24) sK i n  
D 
v a r i a n t  1 ,  S i n  v a r i a n t  2 and sR i n  v a r i a n t  3 a r e  t axes  i f ,  
however, 8 > 1 ,  then they are subs id ies  (with t h e  oppos i te  s i g n ) .  
